The Democratic Campaign
Managing the Cleveland
campaign were William Barnum, the Democratic national chairman,
and Calvin Brice, a railroad promoter. Brice papered
important states like New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut with
tariff reform and pro-Cleveland literature, but by September
most of the funds had dried up as complaints mounted about the
campaign’s lethargy. The president did little to advance
the effort besides his letter of acceptance (in September) and a
few publicized letters on policy. Except for the American
Free Trade League, Democrats lacked assistance from
organizations of the type on which Republicans heavily relied
(mainly related to the tariff issue).
Almost by default, the brunt of the campaign fell on Thurman,
the vice presidential candidate. The nomination had
surprised the 74-year-old politician, irritated his wife, and
provoked National Chairman Barnum to quip, “We might just as
well nominate a corpse.” But Thurman dutifully accepted,
and began an ambitious speaking tour, taking him from Ohio (his
home state) and Michigan in August to New York and New Jersey in
September to West Virginia, Indiana, and back to Ohio in
October. His brief speeches were mixtures of explaining
why high tariffs were bad for workingmen and consumers and
delineating his physical ailments, such as cholera, head cold,
and neuralgia. He collapsed twice on stage, once at New
York City’s Madison Square Garden and then in Newark, New
Jersey. The press understandably concentrated on Thurman’s
poor health.
The Republican Campaign
By contrast, the Republican
campaign was highly efficient and effective, with Matthew Quay,
chairman of the Republican National Committee, managing the
political strategy and businessman John Wanamaker overseeing the
finances. Wanamaker created committees that solicited
contributions from business, financial, and industrial leaders
and also tapped the personal assets of Republican senators,
raising an unprecedented amount estimated at $3 million ($56.6
million in 2002 dollars). In addition, two forms of
organizations were important for the effectiveness of the
Republican campaign: associations promoting high tariffs
(e.g., American Iron and Steel Association and the American
Protective Tariff League) and local Republican clubs. The
former carried the Republican’s main message to citizens through
informational literature. The latter, which included Young
Republican Clubs, became an integral part of energetic
grassroots campaigning and coordinated well with the party’s
state and national committees.
James Clarkson
of Iowa, editor of the Des Moines Register and
vice-chairman of the Republican National Committee, scheduled
political rallies across the country from July through October,
assigning congressmen and local officials to specific tasks.
James Blaine and John Sherman made major speaking tours for the
national ticket. The star of the show, though, was the
candidate himself. Harrison adopted the strategy of James
Garfield, the 1880 Republican nominee, by conducting a “front
porch” campaign in which he spoke to groups of supporters who
had been transported to his Indianapolis home. However,
unlike Garfield, who stuck to patriotic themes, Harrison
hammered away at the issues in 94 speeches delivered in a clear,
logical, and emphatic manner. He discussed various points
from the Republican platform, but emphasized the tariff, warning
that the Democrats favored free trade, which would lead to lower
wages and fewer jobs for Americans.
The Tariff, the Fisheries Treaty, and the Murchison Letter
In July, after the end
of both political conventions, the House of Representatives
passed the Mills tariff reform bill. In the Senate,
Republican William Allison offered a substitute bill, which
lowered some rates (cutting raw sugar duties in half), placed
many items not manufactured in America on a duty-free list, and
abolished domestic taxes on tobacco and medicinal alcohol.
In all, it reduced revenue by over $70 million dollars while
retaining the protectionist nature of the tariff system.
Since the Mills bill only cut revenue by $55 million, Democrats
were hard pressed to explain why it was better for reducing the
treasury surplus than the Republican alternative. Although
the congressional tug-of-war intensified the tariff debate in
the presidential campaign, neither bill became law.
Also in July,
the Senate rejected the Cleveland administration’s treaty on the
fisheries controversy. The Republican charge that the
document was too pro-British was, like their platform
endorsement of Irish home rule and their linkage of Democratic
tariff reform with British free trade, a calculated attempt to
attract Irish Americans to the GOP. The president, though,
played political hardball by asking for congressional authority
to ban the importation of all goods from British Canada.
Congress refused, as Cleveland foresaw, but the request allowed
him to appear tough with Britain. It was also a threat to
New England Republicans, since the region’s railroads were the
major transporter of products from Canada.
In September, a
Republican businessman, falsely identifying himself as a
British-born American citizen (Charles F. Murchison), solicited
the opinion of the British minister to the United States, Sir
Lionel Sackville-West, on the presidential election. The
diplomat’s written response—that the Cleveland administration
was more interested than Republicans in good relations with
Britain—was leaked to the press in late October.
Sackville-West made matters worse when he publicly criticized
both the Senate’s rejection of the fisheries treaty and the
president’s sweeping counterproposal. After the British
government refused to remove the minister, the president
dismissed him. In the end, the Republican campaign for
Irish votes was apparently unsuccessful, with Cleveland’s
percentage in the Irish districts of New York City and Boston
higher than his totals in 1884.
|